



The 2000 presidential election and the information cost of sensitive versus non-sensitive S&P 500 stocks[☆]

Yan He^a, Hai Lin^b, Chunchi Wu^c, Uric B. Dufrene^{a,*}

^aIndiana University Southeast, USA

^bXiamen University, China

^cUniversity of Missouri at Columbia, USA

Available online 7 May 2008

Abstract

We investigate the information cost of stock trading during the 2000 presidential election. We find that the uncertainty of the election induces information asymmetry of politically sensitive firms under the Bush/Gore platforms. The unusual delay in election results creates a significant increase in the adverse selection component of the trading cost of politically sensitive stocks. Cross-sectional variations in bid-ask spreads are significantly and positively related to changes in information cost, controlling for the effects of liquidity cost and stock characteristics. This empirical evidence is robust to different estimation methods.

© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

JEL classification: G0; G14

Keywords: Presidential election; Information asymmetry; Transaction costs; Bid-ask spreads; Adverse selection cost

1. Introduction

Numerous studies have shown that political elections affect stock markets. [Herbst and Slinkman \(1984\)](#), [Huang \(1985\)](#), [Hensel and Ziemba \(1995\)](#), and [Santa-Clara and](#)

[☆]We thank the editor, Bruce Lehmann, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 812 941 2308; fax: +1 812 941 2672.

E-mail address: yanhe@ius.edu (U.B. Dufrene).